COORDINATION OF EUROPEAN RESEARCH ON INDUSTRIAL SAFETY TOWARDS SMART AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH



10 th SAF€RA Symposium "Safety in the age of digitalization and advanced materials"

RESMOD Project RESilience enhancement MODel

Maria Francesca Milazzo

Department of Engineering University of Messina, Italy mfmilazzo@unime.it



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- Organizational resilience modelling and results
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Background: Complexity


- New threats impacting the industrial world increase the risk.
- Need for a holistic strategy for protection, prevention and response which, to be effective, must be based on aspects of resilience.
- Resilience is a complex concept that encompasses several dimensions.




RESilience enhancement MODel

Background: Resilience dimensions

- The **technological dimension** => the characteristics and behavior of <u>physical components and systems</u> in the case of a change or incident.
- The organizational dimension => the organizations and institutions that manage the physical components of the systems.
- The social dimension => the population and community characteristics that render social groups either more vulnerable or more adaptable to hazards and disasters.
- The economic dimension => <u>direct and indirect</u> <u>economic losses</u> resulting from disasters.



Background: Resilient systems



RESMOD project: Aims

SAF€RA's 2021 call: «Industrial safety in the

context of pandemics and exponential change»

Topic:

«Lessons learned from Covid-19 and capacity building for resilient response»

Project idea:

- a conceptual model for the organizational resilience evaluation for different industrial sectors covering both the manufacturing and the process sides and relying on the actual experience gained during the first and second waves of the pandemic emergency.
- organizational resilience assessment and resilience indicators setting-up to support business continuity and help dealing with unexpected events, absorbing the disruptive potential.

RESMOD project: Research teams and funding institutions

😈 Università di **Genova**

VSB TECHNICAL

Ш

UNIVERSITY

OF OSTRAVA

• University of Genoa, Polytechnic School, (DICCA) Department of Civil Chemical and Environmental Engineering

Prof. Bruno Fabiano

 Consortium of VSB-Technical University of Ostrava, Faculty of Safety Engineering and Czech Occupational Safety Research Institute- VUBP (VSB)

Prof. Ales Bernatik

BELGRADE



 University of Belgrade-Faculty of Mechanical Engineering

Prof. Vesna Spasojevic Brkic

- University of Messina- Department of Engineering
 - Prof Maria Francesca Milazzo



ISTITUTO NAZIONALE PER L'ASSICURAZIONE CONTRO GLI INFORTUNI SUL LAVORO





МИНИСТАРСТВО ПРОСВЕТЕ



ISTITUTO NAZIONALE PER L'ASSICURAZIONE CONTRO GLI INFORTUNI SUL LAVORO

22nd April 2024, Vienna (Austria)

RESilience enhancement MODel

RESMOD project: Methodology

Main constitutive elements

- 1. Preventative control (defensive consistency). It is achieved by means of risk management.
- 2. Mindful action (defensive flexibility). It is the ability to 'bounce forward', to grow and prosper in the future.
- 3. Performance optimisation (progressive consistency). It relies on continuously improving, refining and extending existing competencies, enhancing ways of working and exploiting current technologies.
- 4. Adaptive innovation (progressive flexibility). Creating, inventing and exploring unknown solutions are the pillars of this property.

CONTROL

ADAPTIVE INNOVATION

Flexibility PREVENTATIVE MINDFUL CONTROL ACTION Defensive Identification of deviations / perturbations Data exploitation - Machine Learning Identification of weak signals Anticipation of expected system output MINDFUL ACTION Identification and avoidance of precursors Appropriate adjustements

Progressive

ADAPTIVE


INNOVATION

PERFORMANCE OPTIMISATION

PERFORMANCE

OPTIMIZATION

RESMOD project: Methodology



RESilience enhancement MODel

 Identification of industrial sectors and activities liable to be impacted by pandemic and elaboration of Organizational Resilience check-list;

 Design and elaboration of ad-hoc questionnaire;

• Selection of pilot case studies in each country and data analysis;

 Design of a Systemic Resilience Model (SRM) for identifying the significant precursors of an accident, or near miss under pandemic condition and it is developed with a data driven approach.

RESMOD project: Case-studies





Seveso industry, process industry, and transportation sector



Transport and mining companies





Volunteer fire brigade units, representatives of the Central Fire School in White Poličany and of Fire Brigade







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Organizational resilience modeling: Data collection

- Questions
- Answer on a 5-point Likert scale

Leadership and worker

1. The organization ensures that workers at all levels are encouraged to report hazardous situations, so that preventive measures can be put in place and corrective actions taken

2. Processes for the assessment of risk to the OH&S management system consider day-to-day operations and decisions (e.g. peaks in workflow), as well as external issues (e.g. economic change)

3. When the assessment of OH&S and other risks has identified the need for controls, the planning activity determines how these are implemented in operation (such as emergency planning with including financial aspects)

4. OH&S objectives affect the risks and opportunities and performance criteria identified by the organization as necessary to achieve the planned results of the OH&S management system

Support

1. The organization provides the resources needed for the establishment, implementation, maintenance and continual improvement of the OH&S management system*

2. The competence of workers is affected by the knowledge and skills needed to appropriately identify hazards and deal with OH&S risks associated with their work and workplaces

3. Temporary workers, contractors and subcontractors, visitors and any other parties are not able (trained) to identify threats and reduce the OH&S risks to which they are exposed on the work

4. The communication process(es) established by the organization provide the gathering, updating and dissemination of information and ensure that relevant information is provided, received and understandable to all relevant workers and interested parties

5. The complexity of the documented information is at the minimum possible level and includes documented information regarding planning to address legal requirements and other requirements on the evaluation of the effectiveness of these actions

Organizational resilience modelling: Data collection

Operation

1. The management timely provides the on-site personnel with adequate protective equipment and such execution of the procedure is adequately considered as the additional risk

2. The shutdown procedures include even the case of unexpected stop of unpredictable duration and the startup procedures include even the restart after a prolonged forced stop

3. The impact of the EMERGENCY measures on the safety procedures (e.g. applicability, time of response) and the impact on safety of organisational changes (including lack of staff and supply outage) are adequately evaluated

4. Permit to work and other recognition and control methods are used as opportunity to address system improvement strategies

5. When outsourcing, the organization has control of the outsourced functions and process(es) to achieve the intended outcome(s) of the OH&S management system and the responsibility for conforming to the requirements is retained by the organization

Performance evaluation and Improvement

1. System response evaluation is done regularly, and often when needed

2. Top management review the organization's OH&S management system at planned intervals, to ensure its continued suitability adequacy and effectiveness

3. The organization establishes, implements and maintains a process(es) (including reporting, investigating and taking action) to determine and manage incidents and nonconformities

4. Continual improvement includes promotion of preparedness culture, safe behavior and resilience

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Seveso and process industry and transport







RESilience enhancement MODel

Preliminary approach


- Harmonising resilience model within SMS-MAH
 - The application of the SMS-MAH can be conceived according to Italian guidelines or the ISO 31000 approach. Some elements that allows the system reacting to face unexpected difficulties and restoring the previous safety conditions or equivalent conditions are introduced
- Resilience performance assessment
 - Evaluation approach to Resilience performances, including suitable assessment criteria retrieved by expert elicitation and calculation of the relative rankings and correlations by using AHP method

SMS POINT	Health Emergency Resilience Indicators	Four Corners					
1. Policy	 Higher level strategies, including health plan Business continuity plan (activities essential for safety, recovery times, etc.) in the event of emergencies outside the plant 	ANTICPATE REACT					
	3. Financial studies on organisational impacts of health emergency	ANTICIPATE					
	4. Identification of the resources necessary to support critical activities (people,	MONITOR					
2. Resources &	processes, equipment)5. Define face-to-face and remote meetings						
Leadership	6. Policies for employees infected or suspected of being infected7. Agile / flexible work policies and flexibility of working time, including permits,						
	temporary leaves and travel restrictions	REACT					
	8. Identification of key sources of information on the epidemic, including trade	ANTICIPATE					
3. Risk	associations, research institutes, experts 9. Identification of critical activities that cannot be suspended	MONITOR					
Assessment	 10. Identification of circumstances in which it may be necessary to suspend operations 11. Possibility of remote process control (e.g., SCADA) 						
	11. Tossibility of remote process control (e.g., Seribit)	MONITOR					
4. Operating Control, (including maintenance)	12. Timely documentation of the activities carried out for health emergencies	LEARN					
	13. Specific attention to work permits, with extension of measures also to third parties14. Specific measures for a safe shut-down for a longer or indeterminate period,	MONITOR					
	considering the degradation of hazardous materials 15. Measures for a safe restart after prolonged shutdown, including warehouses	LEARN					
		LEARN					
7) 1	16. Assessment of the effects on safety of the procedural changes introduced to meet the needs of the health plan	MONITOR					
5. MANAGEMENT OF CHANGES	17. Assessment of the safety impact of organisational changes, including selected staff and supply outage						
	18. Assessment of collective and personal protective equipment (C/ PPE)	MONITOR					
	19. Assigning responsibility for planning in the event of an epidemic	ANTICIPATE					
6. Emergency	20. Communications to personnel and other interested parties on the progress of the emergency and the repercussions on the management system	REACT					
MANAGEMENT	21. Availability of individual and collective protection equipment 22. Sanitation of work environments						
	22. Sanitation of work environments	REACT					
7. Performance Evaluation	23. Analysis of the system's reactions to the pressures of the external context (evaluation of strengths and weaknesses) and sharing with all staff	LEARN					
	24. Staff behaviour observation system	LEARN					
8. Review & Improvement	25. The review takes into account in particular the response of the safety management system to the health emergency	REACT					


Preliminary approach


In the framework of Seveso establishments, 25 indicators are reported according to the SMS-MAH scheme with the related link to the four corners of OR.

A scoring questionnaire has been developed and distributed at the Seveso sites, to be filled in by the establishment's operator. It allows eliciting quantitative description of trends by AHP, opinions and attitudes from a sample of a given population.



Preliminary approach results





Resilience index

$$I_{R} = \sum_{i=1}^{25} s_{i} \cdot w_{i} / \sum_{i=1}^{25} w_{i}$$

$$I_{R,SMS j} = \sum_{i=k_{j}}^{k_{j+1}} s_{j} \cdot w_{i} / \sum_{i=k_{j}}^{k_{j+1}} w_{i}$$

 $2.5 \leq I_R < 3.5$

 $3.5 \le I_R$


 $\label{eq:meaning} \frac{\mbox{Meaning of resilience indicator.}}{1 \le I_R < 1.5 \qquad 1.5 \le I_R < 2.5}$

Bad Poor Ade	quate Good
--------------	------------

			uninht	partial weights				partial IR					IR overall	3.
SMS MAH	indicator	SCORE	weight	A	м	R L		Α	М	R L			ik overali	3.
	maleator	OOONL	100.0%	0% 26% <mark>43%</mark> 23% 9% 3		3.3	3.2	2.9 2.8 scores VV			Partial IR SMS			
I) POLICY	2 Business continuity	4	1.4%			1.4%				0.056		0.056	4.0	
	3 Financial Studies	4	0.5%	0.5%				0.02				0.02	4.0	
	4 Critical Resources	2	6.3%		6.3%				0.126			0.126		
II) RESOURCES	5 Meetings	3	1.2%			1.2%				0.036		0.036	2.0	
II) RESOURCES	6 Infected policy	2	2.0%			2.0%				0.04		0.04	2.0	
	7 Agile work	1	1.5%			1.5%				0.015		0.015		
	8 Sources of information	4	8.3%	8.3%				0.332				0.332		
III) RISK	9 Critical Activities	3	7.8%		7.8%				0.234			0.234	3.4	
ASSESSMENT	10 Operation Suspension	2	1.9%		1.9%				0.038			0.038	3.4	
	11 Remote Control	4	2.7%		2.7%				0.108			0.108		
	12 Documentation of the activ	3	4.7%				4.7%				0.14	0.141		
IV) OPERATING	13 Permit to Work	3	9.7%		9.7%				0.291			0.291	3.2	
CONTROL	14 Safe Shutdown	3	5.3%	5.3%				0.159				0.159	3.2	
	15 Safe Start-up	4	3.7%	3.7%				0.148				0.148		
	16 Procedures Impact Asses	4	5.7%		5.7%				0.228			0.228		
V) MGMNT OF CHANGES	17 Organization Impact Asse	3	5.5%		5.5%				0.165			0.165	3.6	
UNANGES	18 PPE Impact Assessment F	4	3.7%		3.7%				0.148			0.148		
VI) EMERGENCY	19 Assigning Responsibility	4	2.0%	3.7%				0.148				0.08		
	20 Communication	4	2.9%			2.9%				0.116		0.116	3.5	
	21 PPE	4	3.6%			3.6%				0.144		0.144	3.0	
	22 Sanitation	2	2.7%			2.7%				0.054		0.054		
VII)	23 System Response Evalua	3	2.5%				2.5%				0.08	0.075	2.6	
PERFORMANCES	24 Staff Behaviour	2	1.5%				1.5%				0.03	0.03	2.0	
VIII) REVIEW	25 Review	3	8.0%			8.0%				0.24		0.24	3.0	

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Advanced approach: Components to be analysed



Identified OR factors

ANTICIPATE

- Higher level strategies, including health plan
- Financial studies on organizational impacts of health emergency
- Identification of key sources of information on the epidemic (trade, associations, research institutes, etc.)
- Assigning responsibility for planning in case of epidemic

MONITOR

- Identification of critical activities that cannot be suspended
- Identification of circumstances in which it may be necessary to suspend operations
- Possibility of remote process control (e.g., SCADA)
- Assessment of the effects on safety of the procedural changes introduced to meet the needs of the health plan
- Assessment of the safety impact of organizational changes, including selected staff and supply outage
- Assessment of collective and personal protective equipment
- Specific attention to work permits, with extension of measures also to third parties
- Identification of the necessary resources to support critical activities (people, processes, equipment)

LEARN


- Timely documentation of activities carried out for health emergencies Staff behaviour observation system
- Specific measures for a safe shutdown for a longer or indeterminate period of time, taking into account the degradation of hazardous materials
- Measures for a safe restart after prolonged shutdown, including warehouses
- Analysis of the system's reactions to the external pressures (strengths and weaknesses) and sharing with all staff

REACT

- Business continuity plan (activities essential for safety, recovery times, etc.) in case of outside emergencies
- Review of the response of the safety management system to the health emergency
- Define face-to-face and remote meetings
- Policies for employees infected or suspected of being infected
- Agile/flexible work policies and flexibility of working time, including permits, temporary leaves and travel restrictions
- Communications on the progress of the emergency and the effects on the management system
- Availability of individual and collective protection equipment
- Sanitation of work environment

Causal relations

PC basic algorithm relies on the concept of conditional independence to infer causal relationships between variables. Systematically testing for conditional independence and eliminating spurious relationships by the ah-hoc implemented algorithm allowed obtained a causal network representing the underlying causal structure of the data



Causal relations conclusions

From the learned network structure, it is possible to infer the following insights on organizational causality:

- Employee training and procedural adherence were found to have a direct impact on organizational resilience, as evidenced by their strong connections to business impact/continuity and suspension incidents.
- Indirect causal paths were observed between factors such as *company size, industry sector,* and organizational resilience, indicating the complex nature of organizational dynamics.

The learned causal network structure underlines that a **fully developed Safety Management System** (SMS) plays a crucial role in ensuring the safety and well-being of personnel, assets, and the environment.

The utmost importance lies in **adhering to SMS procedures** to minimize the likelihood of accidents, incidents, and disruptions that could compromise safety and operational continuity, in particular regarding the approaches to:

- Risk Management
- Safety Culture
- Compliance and Regulations

In face of an unexpected event, such the pandemic, the ability **to update** and innovate within the SMS framework is essential for maintaining safety while optimizing organizational performance. This facet involves:

- Real-time Monitoring and Reporting addressing early warning
- Continuous Improvement

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Transport and mining companies





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Organizational resilience modelling e results

- To assess organizational resilience at different organizational levels in transport and mining companies in Serbia, a questionnaire was created based on previous research.
- Aspects of organizational resilience later on have been modelled by AHP are Anticipation, Monitoring, Reaction and Learning.
- The weight coefficients obtained with the AHP model, were used to calculate the resilience index.

Area	Safety performance	Job satisfaction	Pravila i procedure	Security policy	Safety training	Safety measures and accident prevention	Risk assessment	Manager support	Organizational environment	Safety communication	Security awareness and competence
Chief	0.039	0.028	0.046	0.026	0.043	0.062	0.040	0.049	0.053	0.035	0.034
Sampler	0.052	0.056	0.062	0.065	0.049	0.032	0.105	0.039	0.078	0.053	0.061
Welder	0.073	0.075	0.086	0.081	0.074	0.056	0.049	0.063	0.000	0.070	0.068
Maintenance manager	0.043	0.032	0.030	0.047	0.044	0.044	0.042	0.069	0.067	0.053	0.040
Excavator manager	0.046	0.042	0.054	0.045	0.023	0.070	0.028	0.054	0.023	0.040	0.030
Executive manager	0.049	0.061	0.058	0.061	0.074	0.054	0.040	0.075	0.069	0.066	0.051
Operator	0.057	0.059	0.060	0.049	0.060	0.049	0.054	0.056	0.033	0.057	0.059
Foreman	0.042	0.032	0.007	0.012	0.043	0.032	0.012	0.038	0.069	0.017	0.020
Overconcentra tion	0.055	0.066	0.074	0.078	0.070	0.067	0.059	0.080	0.087	0.060	0.061
Manager	0.051	0.050	0.057	0.062	0.066	0.056	0.051	0.057	0.061	0.052	0.057
Handler	0.058	0.050	0.054	0.057	0.046	0.053	0.053	0.065	0.051	0.069	0.052
Mechanic	0.000	0.039	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.061	0.049	0.000	0.093	0.034	0.040
Storekeeper	0.073	0.075	0.086	0.081	0.074	0.048	0.077	0.042	0.007	0.066	0.068
Crane operator	0.055	0.047	0.043	0.040	0.043	0.044	0.053	0.027	0.054	0.040	0.041
Engineer	0.048	0.036	0.053	0.050	0.039	0.052	0.057	0.054	0.054	0.040	0.044
Electrical engineer	0.055	0.038	0.052	0.053	0.043	0.040	0.053	0.050	0.030	0.040	0.047
Electrician	0.044	0.051	0.055	0.052	0.062	0.056	0.056	0.063	0.049	0.051	0.056
Dumpster	0.054	0.064	0.036	0.024	0.049	0.041	0.000	0.025	0.029	0.070	0.068
Locksmith	0.055	0.038	0.043	0.046	0.049	0.035	0.051	0.030	0.069	0.035	0.037
Excavator	0.054	0.064	0.050	0.073	0.052	0.052	0.077	0.063	0.021	0.056	0.068
Model Weights	0.042	0.054	0.066	0.047	0.045	0.060	0.055	0.030	0.068	0.056	0.057

Organizational resilience modelling e

results

			Partial weight					Partial	IR			
Workplace	Resul t	Weigh t	R	A	м	L	R	A	м	L	overal I	
							3.3	2,5	2,5	1,6		1
Overconcentration	0.068	6.79%	2.32 %	1.86 %	1.69 %	0.91 %	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.180	
Welder	0.066	6.57%	2.07 %	1.59 %	1.69 %	1.21 %	0.06	0.04	0.05 4	0.04	0.170	
Storekeeper	0.063	6.29%	2.02 %	1.46 %	1.60 %	1.21 %	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.162	Good
Manager	0.060	5.98%	2.05 %	1.67 %	1.45 %	0.81 %	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.159	
Excavator	0.058	5.80%	1.68 %	1.76 %	1.47 %	0.90 %	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.150	
Low manager	0.057	5.66%	1.75	1.54 %	1.40 %	0.96	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.147	
Foreman	0.056	5.56%	1.91 %	1.38 %	1.42 %	0.85	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.147	
Operator	0.055	5.49%	1.79	1.37 %	1.38	0.94	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.143	Adequate
Sampler	0.054	5.42%	2.04	1.27	1.25	0.86	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.144	Ad
Electrician	0.054	5.36%	1.84	1.40	1.38	0.73	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.142	
Engineer	0.048	4.76%	1.63	1.25	1.08	0.81	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.125	
Maintenance manager	0.047	4.71%	1.47 %	1.51	1.02	0.71 %	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.123	
Electrical engineer	0.046	4.61%	1.48	1.20 %	1.02	0.91 %	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.119	-*
Dumpster	0.045	4.55%	1.34 %	0.84	1.47	0.90 %	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.116	Weak
Excavator operator	0.045	4.46%	1.25	1.06	1.38	0.76	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.115	
Crane operator	0.043	4.33%	1.42 %	0.88 %	1.13	0.91 %	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.111	
Locksmith	0.043	4.26%	1.48	0.94	0.92	0.91	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.110	
Chief	0.042	4.18%	1.37	1.07	1.09	0.65	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.109	_
Foreman	0.030	2.99%	1.16	0.63	0.50	0.70 %	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.078	Ba
Mechanic	0.023	2.26%	1.27 %	0.34 %	0.65	0.00 %	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.067	

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Volunteer fire brigade units



VSB TECHNICAL



RESilience enhancement MODel

Czech approach

- COVID-19 crisis in clear form impacted emergency rescue system
- Consultation of firefighters:
 - Open discussions
 - Consultations with lectors
 - Anonymous web-based questionnaire

Results

Remarks to the resilience of emergency response system extracted from questionnaire:

- Communication gaps:
 - One-directional
 - Not enough form "above"
 - Information chaotic and contradictory
 - Power-play instead of leadership
- Local unit felt to be "abandoned" by headquarter and government
- Real resilience was observed much more at local level that at central level



Conclusive remarks



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Conclusions

- Industrial plants can be described as complex systems, whose overall management is mainly related to the interactions of the sub-systems, rather than the management of the sub-systems themselves.
- The main issue is, indeed, the need of understanding the complex interactions amongst the single parts. Accidents and incidents are often due to poor interaction understanding, or to the inability to deal with them.
- Nevertheless, the safety management of complex systems can be optimised by identifying and analysing all threats that undermine them.
- The crux of the project proposal is the anticipation of situations that can lead to accidents or incidents, in order to intercept them before they will become critical.

COORDINATION OF EUROPEAN RESEARCH ON INDUSTRIAL SAFETY TOWARDS SMART AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH

10 th SAF€RA Symposium "Safety in the age of digitalization and advanced materials"



THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION

Maria Francesca Milazzo

Department of Engineering University of Messina, Italy <u>mfmilazzo@unime.it</u>

